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ABSTRACT 
The increased pressure put on public research institutes to commercialize their 
research results has given rise to an increased academic interest in technology transfer 
in general and science based entrepreneurial firms specifically. By building on 
innovation speed and knowledge literatures, this paper aims to improve understanding 
of how tacit knowledge can be effectively transferred from the research institute to the 
science based entrepreneurial firm. More specifically, we assess under which 
conditions tacit knowledge contributes to the generation of innovation speed, which is 
a crucial success parameter for technology based ventures. Using an inductive case 
study approach, we show that tacit knowledge can only be transferred effectively 
when a substantial part of the original research team joins the new venture as 
founders. Our analysis also reveals that the mere transfer of tacit knowledge is 
insufficient to ensure the successful commercialization of technology. Commercial 
expertise is also required on the condition that the cognitive distance between the 
scientific researchers and the person responsible for market interaction is not too large. 
Our findings have implications for science based entrepreneurs, technology transfer 
officers, venture capitalists, policy makers and the academic community. 
 
Key words: science based entrepreneurial firms; tacit knowledge; technology transfer; 
innovation speed; cognitive distance 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade, there has been a substantial increase in the creation of 
academic spin-offs or more generally termed Science Based Entrepreneurial Firms 
(SBEFs) (Wright et al., 2007; Clarysse and Moray, 2004). This rise stems from the 
pressure faced by public research institutes (PRIs), including universities, to 
commercialize at least part of their research results through licensing and/or new 
ventures. Not surprisingly, a stream of research has followed identifying the drivers of 
technology transfer and commercialization including intellectual property (Siegel et 
al., 2003; Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003; Thursby and Thursby, 2002), contract 
research (Poyago Theotoky et al., 2002), graduate and researcher mobility (Argote and 
Ingram, 2000), the role of the technology transfer office (Debackere and Veugelers, 
2005; Wright et al., 2008), and science parks and incubators (Phan et al., 2005).  
What is less clear from this growing body of literature is what drives 
successful technology transfer and commercialization particularly from the perspective 
of SBEFs. While success from the perspective of the PRI has been studied by 
examining the drivers of licensing revenues and new venture creation rates (Bray and 
Lee, 2000; Lawton Smith and Ho, 2006; Markman et al., 2005; Lockett and Wright, 
2005), understanding the performance of SBEFs that emerge from these PRIs has been 
largely neglected (Colombo and Grilli, 2005). Addressing this gap remains a major 
policy issue since the performance of many SBEFs has been limited, not to say 
disappointing (Wright, et al., 2007; Siegel and Wright, 2007). Understanding the 
processes underpinning performance is important since the development of SBEFs 
emerging from PRIs faces distinctive challenges.  
First, SBEFs are characterized by high levels of innovation in new and rapidly 
changing markets (Ittner and Larcker, 1997). Such innovation is subject to rapid 
depreciation and hence speed of innovation may be important to obtain a competitive 
advantage (Markman et al., 2005; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). Innovation speed is 
the time elapsed between an initial discovery and its commercialization (Kesser and 
Chakrabarti, 1996). Yet there is insufficient understanding of the factors that explain 
and predict differences in innovation speed. For example, while Markman et al. (2005) 
examine the role of innovation speed in determining the number of new ventures at the 
University Technology Transfer Office (UTTO) level, they do not examine the factors 
influencing innovation speed and the performance of SBEFs at the firm level.  
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Second, SBEFs are characterized by shortcomings in the knowledge required 
for commercialization (Lockett et al., 2005). SBEFs are usually formed around the 
technology transferred from the research institute and the very specific knowledge that 
is inextricably linked to that technology which is typically embodied in the academic 
scientists and entrepreneurs (Wright et al., 2006; Clarysse et al., 2007). As the 
technology is rarely market ready, knowledge surrounding the technology is needed to 
modify or tailor associated products / services to meet customer requirements (Di 
Gregorio and Shane, 2003; Zucker et al., 1998b). Despite recognition of knowledge 
gaps both in the routines of UTTOs (Lockett et al., 2005) and in the skills of academic 
entrepreneurs (Franklin, Wright and Lockett, 2001; Mosey and Wright, 2007), 
understanding remains limited concerning how knowledge might best be transferred 
and effectively utilized in the context of SBEFs.  Markman et al. (2008) point to the 
fact that as a part of the evolutionary path of spin-off firms there is often a need to 
reorient the business and to reconfigure the technology. They indicate that research on 
research and technology commercialization has so far neglected identifying the most 
effective configurations of entrepreneurial teams for the commercialization of 
research. Apart from the limited understanding on factors influencing innovation 
speed and effective configuration of entrepreneurial teams, little understanding exists 
on the link between knowledge, innovation speed and venture success at the SBEF 
level.  
This study presents a first attempt to bring together insights relating to 
innovation speed and the knowledge of founding entrepreneurs required to develop 
SBEFs. Specifically, we address the following broad research question: What is the 
nature of the relationship between the knowledge of team founders, innovation speed 
and SBEF performance? 
In order to address this research question, we conduct a longitudinal inductive 
study by drawing on innovation speed theory and the knowledge based view of the 
firm, as well as nine case studies of SBEFs that originated from IMEC, a top research 
institute in the area of micro-electronics situated in Belgium (Moray and Clarysse, 
2005). IMEC provides an important context for our purpose since in each of the 
SBEFs, the research institute held equity positions which were either sold or lost their 
value.  
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As such we are able to use an objective measure of SBEF performance by 
measuring the valuation of the SBEFs at the moment the PRI’s shares are sold to 
investors or industrial parties or at the moment of liquidation.  Interviews were carried 
out with founders of the SBEFs at multiple points in time. Their views were 
corroborated with evidence from the IMEC TTO and other documentary evidence. 
The paper is structured as follows. The following section situates our study 
within the innovation speed and knowledge literatures. We then present the research 
design and methodology, followed by a description of the cases. Next, we present the 
results of an iterative process of analyzing our data and comparing it with extant 
literature and theories of innovation speed and knowledge. Finally, we reflect on our 
findings and discuss their implications for scientist entrepreneurs, technology transfer 
officers in PRIs as well as wider policy issues.  
 
 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES: INNOVATION SPEED THEORY AND 
THE KNOWLEDGE BASED VIEW OF THE FIRM 
 
We draw on two separate theoretical perspectives, innovation speed theory and 
the knowledge-based view of the firm. In this section we explain how these 
perspectives can be used to understand SBEF performance. More importantly, we 
highlight how using these two theories together may be more informative than using 
them in isolation. 
Innovation speed is likely particularly important for SBEFs.  SBEFs tend to 
operate in environments where innovation is valued and is often the basis of 
competition. In such circumstances accelerated innovation speed becomes essential 
since any given window for exploiting technological discoveries is constantly 
shrinking due to knowledge spillovers, imitation by competition and technological 
obsolescence (Markman et al., 2005). Further, greater innovation speed may allow the 
organization to experiment with a greater number of new technologies and / or product 
features, thus spreading the costs of errors over several efforts whilst increasing the 
likelihood of successful innovations (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Ittner and Larcker, 1997; 
Schoonhoven et al.,1990; Langerak and Hultink, 2005; Lieberman and Montgomery, 
1988).  
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Although the concept of innovation speed is not new, it has mostly been 
applied in the context of established organizations. Kesser and Chakrabati (1996) 
propose that the antecedents of innovation speed include factors such as firms’ 
strategic orientations and organizational capabilities that can either facilitate or retard 
the pace of development. While these factors may be relevant to established 
businesses, they may be less applicable to newer ventures whose strategic orientation 
is not fully established and where organizational capabilities are yet to be developed. 
Indeed, Allocca and Kessler (2006) suggest that the antecedents of innovation speed 
vary between smaller ventures and large firms. Extant literature emphasizing 
institutional (Markman et al., 2005) and organizational (Kessler and Chakrabarti, 
1996) antecedents of innovation speed may not be as applicable to new SBEFs 
To commercialize technology successfully, SBEFs need external information 
and feedback from the market, and to revisit and refine the product / service which is 
based on the technology (Leonard and Sensiper, 1998). The speed at which the 
venture goes through these processes will be crucial for successful commercialization. 
Innovation speed is likely to be advanced by an ability to access and utilize 
information and knowledge accessed externally. This suggests that a key antecedent of 
innovation speed in SBEFs will relate to their capacity to access and manage 
knowledge.  
The knowledge based view of the firm sees access to, and the development, 
protection and transfer of knowledge as a means of creating and preserving 
competitive advantage (cf. Grant, 1996; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; Liebenskind, 
1996). Knowledge-based theories of the firm suggest that a firm’s success will depend 
on how well it can a) enhance its own knowledge base (i.e. access to new knowledge); 
b) integrate knowledge; and c) apply knowledge to either successfully develop new 
products / services or improve current products and processes (Grant, 1996; Spender, 
1996; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Kessler et al., 2000).  
Kessler et al. (2000) link knowledge-based theory to innovation speed and 
argue that external sourcing of knowledge may slow down the new product 
development process. They indicate that externally-generated knowledge usually takes 
longer to integrate with the firm’s existing knowledge base because it is harder to 
richly understand and interpret (Bierly and Chakrabarti, 1996).  
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Moreover, they point to the fact that the problems with integrating external 
knowledge will be exacerbated if the knowledge is mostly tacit and complex in nature 
and the firm lacks absorptive capacity in the area (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).  
Knowledge theorists often distinguish between explicit and tacit knowledge. 
Explicit knowledge has the qualities of being relatively easier to codify and 
communicate in a formal, systematic language (Polanyi, 1966; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 
1995; Simonin, 1999). Knowledge that is codified (i.e. explicit) is generally easier and 
quicker to access and transfer, assuming that it is being transferred to a party who can 
read the “codes” (Cowen and Foray, 1997; Chen, 2004; Zander and Kogut, 1995; 
Teece, 1998). In the research institute context, explicit knowledge typically takes the 
form of publications and patents (Hong, 2008) and can be transferred through arms-
length contracting such as licensing. However, there is often a considerable body of 
knowledge not captured in patents and licenses; that is, the tacit component. Polanyi 
(1966: 7) claims that all knowledge is “either tacit or rooted in tacit knowledge. Tacit 
knowledge is acquired by and stored within individuals and is embedded in a social 
and cultural context (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Osterloh and Frey, 2000). A wholly 
explicit knowledge is unthinkable” (original emphasis).  
In a technology transfer context, therefore, the transfer of explicit knowledge 
alone may not result in the successful transfer of knowledge. Tacit knowledge is 
embodied in the inventor / researchers (Lowe, 2006). Its transfer requires inter-
personal communication (Ounjian and Carne, 1987) involving what Roberts (2000: 
439) calls “show-how”. However, due to its very nature, tacit knowledge is difficult to 
communicate. Considerable interaction is required between parties to ensure that new 
codes and formula to describe the technology are developed so that knowledge can be 
transferred from one party to the other (Zucker et al., 2002). The level of interaction 
needed calls for the co-presence and co-location of the transmitter and receiver of 
knowledge (Roberts, 2000). This suggests that it is of crucial importance for the 
discoverer of the technology to work closely with whoever is commercializing it.  
Continued collaboration between the new venture and the original researchers has 
been linked to venture success (Zucker et al., 1998b;  Zucker et al., 2002) suggesting 
that collaboration may be key to the efficient transfer of tacit knowledge.  
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Leonard and Sensiper (1998) liken the innovation process to one of problem 
solving to which tacit knowledge is particularly pertinent. They indicate that the 
reason why experts can solve a problem more efficiently than novices is that the 
experts have in mind a pattern born of experience (i.e., tacit knowledge), which they 
can overlay on a particular problem and use to quickly detect a solution. Given the 
iterative process that innovation requires, tacit knowledge has an important role in 
both stimulating the requisite variety of ideas and then in the convergence that permits 
focus on actionable next steps. Hence access to tacit knowledge in the technology 
transfer will not only facilitate the innovation process, it will also accelerate it.  
 
METHODOLOGY  
Inductive case study approach 
Our study employed an inductive case study approach to understand under 
which conditions tacit knowledge was effectively transferred from the RI to the SBEF 
to ensure sufficient innovation speed and lead to SBEF success. With a few 
exceptions, much of the extant literature on technology transfer from public 
institutions has been quantitative. Qualitative case studies, however, may be highly 
complementary by shedding light on how and why questions (Yin, 2003). Further, 
they are well suited to research that involves observations over time. Our case studies 
were designed to allow investigation into the way each of the individual enterprises 
was created and developed, how they reached sufficient innovation speed, and how 
tacit knowledge was transferred and eventually turned into a financial success or 
failure from the point of view of the research institute. Our approach of examining the 
ventures from gestation to exit by the research institute allows us to explain how a 
sequence of events unfolded over-time to produce a given outcome (Van de Ven, 
2007).  
Within the typology of case study approaches, the design adopted here is 
multi-case, embedded research. The term embedded here refers to the duality of the 
units of analysis, namely the research institute and the spin-off (see also Pettigrew’s 
1973 triangulation methodology using multiple respondents). Given that we only 
study ventures that originated from a research institute that specializes in one field, 
namely the field of micro-electronics, we avoid the impact of sectoral differences on 
knowledge transfer and innovation speed (Kessler and Chakrabarti, 1996). 
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While our approach is inductive in nature, this should not be seen to imply that 
we ignored extant literature / theories. On the contrary, we followed an iterative 
process involving a back-and-forth journey between the data collected and existing 
literature and theories (Van Maanen et al., 2007). This approach was complemented 
by our multiple case analysis. Cases can be treated as a series of independent 
experiments (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997), allowing for the adoption of “replication” 
/ “comparative” logic (Yin, 2003 and Eisenhardt, 1989a, respectively).  
This refers to the way in which evidence is accumulated through comparing 
cases where similar aspects exist, a process yielding theoretical replication (Yin, 
2003).  
  
Identification of cases and data collection 
The cases used in this study all originated from one research institute in 
Belgium, the Inter University Micro Electronics Centre (IMEC). IMEC originated in 
1982 and is based in Leuven, Belgium. IMEC was set up following a program of the 
Flemish government in the field of microelectronics. The program targeted at 
strengthening the microelectronics industry in the Flanders district. This program 
included the establishment of a laboratory for advanced research in microelectronics 
(IMEC), the establishment of a semiconductor foundry and the organisation of a 
training program (now INVOMEC & MTC). Today, IMEC is Europe's leading 
independent research centre in the field of microelectronics, nanotechnology, enabling 
design methods and technologies for ICT systems. The research organization has 
evolved significantly in its technology transfer policies over the years (Moray and 
Clarysse, 2005). IMEC has set up 25 new ventures and because of its long-established 
nature has a track record of realizations. As such, IMEC provides an important context 
to address the research question addressed in this paper.   
We draw on nine cases where the phenomenon of interest (i.e. SBEF 
performance) is “transparently observable” (Eisenhardt, 1989a: 537). Using a finite 
number of cases, usually between four and ten, allows the researcher to balance the 
need to generate rich theory with large amounts of data (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997). 
Data were collected from a variety of sources but primarily using in-depth face-to-face 
or telephone interviews with the founder and/or CEO of each of the nine companies. 
Each interview lasted between one and two hours.  
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The data was verified and supplemented with that obtained from the TTO of 
IMEC and for some cases co-founders, members of the current management team and 
/ or the leading professor of the research group at the PRI from which the venture’s 
technology originated. This process allowed for triangulation (Yin, 2003) and helped 
minimize the effects of retrospection. The interview transcripts and documentary 
evidence were read and reread as data were collected and emerging themes were 
refined as this process progressed. To avoid confirmation biases, two of the authors 
were kept at a distance from the data collection process. 
There is limited consensus surrounding how spin-off performance should be 
measured. Although the use of financial and non-financial yardsticks to measure spin-
off performance is consistent with the entrepreneurship literature (Chandler and 
Hanks, 1993; Ensley et al., 2006) some measures may not be appropriate for high-tech 
spin-offs. For example, technology-based ventures often make strategic choices that 
result in employment growth before sales growth occurs (Delmar et al., 2003; Brush et 
al., 2001) questioning the use of sales based performance measures.  In this study we 
are able to use an objective measure of SBEF performance by measuring the valuation 
of the SBEFs at the moment the PRI’s shares are sold to investors or industrial parties 
or at the moment of liquidation. We only selected those cases where the investments 
had been exited by IMEC. We avoid the problem of success bias as we include SBEFs 
that had either experienced a trade sale, were sold to a financial investor or had been 
liquidated or went bankrupt. Focusing on the exit value realized by IMEC allows us to 
focus on the early stage performance of spin-offs. Our approach has the added 
advantage that the exit value of the investments by the PRI can be objectively 
measured, in comparison to IRR estimations before exit which tend to be overvalued 
(Dittman et al., 2004). Among our cases, four interests had been sold, either through 
trade sale, or through sales to another investor at values that were above historic cost 
(or the price at which IMEC’s TTO acquired shares in the company). We call these the 
success cases since they allowed the investor to realize positive return on investment. 
In three of these cases, the exit route was through trade sale and in one case the TTO’s 
interest was sold to a venture capital fund. In the remaining five cases, IMEC’s 
interest was sold below historic cost. We call these failed cases, since they did not 
allow the TTO to recoup the initial investment. Four of these ventures went bankrupt, 
while another was sold below historic cost to a venture capital fund.  
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Knowing the venture outcomes from the PRI’s perspective allows us to 
identify patterns that may explain the processes underpinning the successful 
commercialization of technology. An important and unusual feature of our study is 
that we were able to obtain access to the founders of failed ventures as well as those 
who founded successful enterprises. The fifth column in Table 1 indicates the venture 
outcome for each of our cases.  
 
Insert Table 1 About Here 
The cases 
Table 1 provides an insight into the companies, their core technology, 
founding date, and whether the companies were product or service companies at the 
moment of start-up. The table also provides an insight into the innovation speed 
obtained by each of the SBEFs, taking into account the stage of product development 
at the moment of founding. For confidentiality reasons, we replaced the company 
names by SBEF1 up to SBEF9. 
SBEF1 originated from a research project that IMEC carried out on behalf of 
the EU Space Agency (ESA). During this project, a chip for satellite communication 
was developed. The company was founded in 1996, six years after the start of the ESA 
project. SBEF2 develops software tools for the exploration of hardware/software 
partitioning, co-simulation and the synthesis of software drivers and interface logic 
between a CPU’s core and supporting hardware. Both SBEF3 and SBEF9 originated 
from the same technology, and commercialized technology on image sensors. SBEF4 
is the only company that started off as a service company, and offers System-on-Chip 
design services. SBEF5 is a company specialized in design technologies for embedded 
software in electronic systems. SBEF6 was founded in 1992 in order to exploit the 
measurement technology for reliability of electronic components. The technology was 
developed based on research at LUC, a Belgian university and IMEC. SBEF7 is a 
company in fixed wireless access, established in 2002. SBEF8 originated from 
research at the UIA, a Belgian University, and IMEC. The company was based on 
research on electronically conducting polymers. The company was set up to develop 
sensor modules for commercial electronic noses, based on new sensor materials.  
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RESULTS 
Our results provide insights that inform our primary research questions. The 
following discussion of results is organized to present our findings in relation to a) the 
relationship between innovation speed and venture performance; b) the role of 
researchers and founders in facilitating tacit knowledge transfer and their impact on 
innovation speed and venture performance; and c) the importance of the knowledge 
composition of the team and the role of cognitive distance among team members. 
 
Innovation Speed and SBEF Performance 
The cases (Table 1) show differences at the level of product development at 
the moment of founding and innovation speed obtained. Whereas two companies 
started up with a product or service that was market-ready, four started up with an 
Alpha-prototype, and three companies were founded without a functioning prototype. 
For those companies that did not have a market-ready product at the time of founding, 
we find substantial differences in the time to product or service. Two companies that 
started with an Alpha prototype had developed a marketable product after half a year. 
The two other companies that had a similar technological starting position both 
required 3 years in order to develop a product out of the technology. In the cases 
where the technology was still in a pre-prototype phase, it took one of the companies 7 
years to finalize the product. In the two other cases, the technology never reached a 
product phase. Naturally, the closer the product is to being market ready, the greater 
the innovation speed. The cases are in line with the expected relationship between 
innovation speed and successful commercialization and subsequently SBEF success. It 
shows that those SBEFS that realized great innovation speed, irrespective of the stage 
of development at time of founding, were more successful than those who did not 
generate sufficient innovation speed.  
The importance of innovation speed for successful commercialization is 
supported by the cases. Three companies (SBEF6, SBEF7 and SBEF8) were founded 
when the technological development was still at an early stage. Both SBEF7 and 
SBEF8 went bankrupt before a marketable product was developed. In the case of 
SBEF7, both the TTO and CEO attributed the failure to similar causes that relate to 
innovation speed. The TTO comments:  
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“The technology that SBEF7 had developed was outstanding. Besides, at the 
moment that they started up, it was clear that there was a window of 
opportunity. This window however closed very fast, with many parties entering 
the market and speed to market was crucial. SBEF7 did not have the resources 
to generate the speed it needed to valorize the opportunity. It is painful to see 
how technologies that were inferior to that of SBEF7 are currently dominating 
the market”. 
 
Similarly, SBEF6 had a proof of concept that was far from a working 
prototype at founding. Two years after start-up, the first measurement equipment was 
ready, but there was little interest from the market, which required not one tool but a 
full set of measurement equipment. It took the company 7 years from start-up to 
develop a full set of equipment of 3 measurement products that were ready for sales. 
The CEO comments:  
 
“In 1994, the first measurement equipment was ready. With this product it was 
possible to measure one component with high resolution but the customers 
were not interested in this equipment, since they needed equipment that could 
measure a full set of components. Besides, the standards had changed and we 
did not have the resources to be present on standardisation meetings and to 
lobby. It took us till 2000 to develop the set that was required by the market”.
  
Researchers, Founders and Innovation Speed 
Having established the importance of innovation speed to the survival and 
performance of SBEFs, we sought to understand the drivers of innovation speed. Our 
data reveals three interesting patterns concerning the effective transfer of tacit 
knowledge and its impact on innovation speed.  
First, it shows that, in cases where no tacit knowledge is transferred, 
innovation speed is affected negatively, resulting in products or services being 
introduced on the market too late, or never finalizing the process from technology to 
product, thus resulting in the failure of the SBEF. Successful knowledge transfer is 
more likely if the original scientists who worked on developing the technology on 
which the venture is based, are also involved in the venture (See Table 2).  
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Even if the knowledge surrounding the technology is codified (e.g. in the form 
of a patent or license), there is likely a tacit component to the knowledge too. Close 
interaction with the original scientists will make the transfer of the tacit knowledge 
more likely.  
SBEF1, SBEF2, SBEF5 and SBEF9 all started at the same level of 
technological development; they all had an Alpha prototype. In the case of SBEF1, the 
company started up with an Alpha prototype of a chip. Six months after founding, the 
company sold the first chip to two large industrial companies. In the case of SBEF2, a 
similar innovation speed was realized: it took the company half a year after founding 
to reach the product phase. In both cases, a significant portion of the founding team 
comprised the original researchers. In the case of SBEF2, the entire research group 
stepped into the new venture. The CEO of SBEF2 comments:  
 
“At the time of spin-off creation, it was crucial to have the people who 
developed the technology within the team because the technology was in their 
heads. Even more important was to ensure that they remained with the 
company throughout time. Therefore it was important to let those people grow 
with the company”.  
 
In contrast, none of the researchers joined SBEF9. Despite having an Alpha 
prototype, SBEF9 struggled to develop a market ready product but gave up after three 
years and went bankrupt. It is interesting to compare SBEF9 with SBEF3 as they were 
both based on the same technology. Although SBEF3 was slightly more advanced in 
terms of technological development in that it had a market ready product / service, in 
contrast to SBEF9, it had the added advantage of having the entire research group in 
its founding team.  
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In stark contrast, despite the “technology being fantastic and promising”, the 
CEO of SBEF9 attributed their failure to the absence of original researchers within the 
founding team:  
 
“The fact that the original developers did not join was problematic for the new 
venture, since the technology proved to be still in a laboratory phase and 
needed a lot more development… The existing software of potential customers 
needed to be adapted in order to read the signal of the image sensors and also 
the hardware needed some adaptations…It was hard to find good technical 
people with this specific knowledge on the labour market”.  
 
Having learnt from the mistakes made in SBEF9, IMEC opted for a different 
strategy with SBEF3 by ensuring that the original researchers joined. This strategy had 
also proved successful with SBEF4 several years earlier.  
It is interesting that while SBEF9 and SBEF3 shared the same technology, the 
main difference between the two companies was that in the latter the original 
researchers joined the venture but did not in the former. This may explain why SBEF9 
failed in reaching sufficient innovation speed and SBEF3 succeeded.  
 
Insert Table 2 About Here 
Second, our data suggests that a critical mass of tacit knowledge is needed. We 
find that only in cases where the majority of the initial researchers joined the SBEF as 
founders, was tacit knowledge transferred effectively, and resulted in reaching 
sufficient innovation speed. SBEFs in which only the minority of the initial 
researchers joined, or which relied on research contracts with the initial researchers to 
access tacit knowledge, failed to generate sufficient innovation speed. As many of the 
technologies in question were developed with teams where team members were inter-
dependent and complementary to one another, being able to draw on some team 
members and not others appeared to result in incomplete tacit knowledge transfer. 
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The (former) CEO of SBEF7 states: 
 
 “At the time of start-up, only one of the researchers stepped into the new 
venture. We definitely lacked R&D capacity to develop the technology into a 
product. Besides, standards were set in the sector, and we missed the people 
who could engage in the discussion on the standards”.  
 
In this case, the lack of tacit knowledge and hence R&D capacity caused 
innovation speed to be too low, especially in a market where speed was crucial for 
success. Similar problems occurred in SBEF6, which was set up without any 
involvement from the original researchers. In one of the cases (SBEF7), only one of 
the researchers was willing to join the new venture. In order to secure access to 
valuable knowledge, 8 researchers from the original research team were employed by 
the venture. The SBEF7 case however shows that research contracts between original 
researchers and the new venture are ineffective in reaching sufficient innovation 
speed. This brings us to our third finding. 
It is not just access to tacit knowledge through close interaction with the 
original scientists that is important for innovation speed. Beyond close interaction, 
other conditions may facilitate effective knowledge transfer. The manner in which 
tacit knowledge is transferred from the PRI to the SBEF appears to be particularly 
important. Osterloh and Frey (2000) argue that intrinsic motivation is particularly 
important in the transfer of tacit knowledge. If individuals are solely motivated by 
extrinsic rewards (or penalties), they will only focus on aspects of knowledge transfer 
that are rewarded, which will favor explicit knowledge transfer (because this is more 
readily observable). This suggests that accessing the knowledge held by the original 
scientists through arms-length employment contracts may help transfer explicit 
knowledge but to a lesser extent tacit knowledge. In contrast, scientists that are 
intrinsically motivated are likely to be more engaged with the venture. Joining the 
founding team will involve greater participation in the venture and suggest greater 
emotional commitment. Emotional commitment and personal involvement are 
important drivers of tacit knowledge transfer (Glynn, 1996). Participation signals an 
agreement on common goals and leads to greater perceived self-determination which 
strengthens intrinsic motivation (Osterloh and Frey, 2000). The CEO of SBEF3 
comments: 
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 “One of the key success drivers for our company is certainly the founding 
team and the technical knowledge we developed within the company. Even 
though we had a product ready at the time of spin-off, the product often needed 
customization for clients and required the developers to exert their 
knowledge.” 
  
It follows therefore, that those original scientists who display greater 
participation in the venture (e.g. by joining the founding team) will facilitate the 
transfer of both explicit and tacit knowledge. In several of the successful cases 
(SBEF2, SBEF3 and SBEF4) all of the researchers from the research institute joined 
the spin-off as founders.  
 
The above discussion leads to the following propositions: 
 
Proposition 1: The greater the proportion of the original research team 
joining the SBEF as founders, the greater will be the transfer of tacit 
knowledge and hence the greater the chances of reaching sufficient innovation 
speed that will lead to enhanced SBEF performance   
 
Knowledge composition of the founding team and innovation speed 
Our data reveals that alongside the extent of tacit knowledge about the 
technology embodied in the number of original researchers transferring to the 
founding team, it is important for the SBEF team also to include a commercial 
mindset for requisite innovation speed to be achieved. A common concern with 
entrepreneurs from a research background (e.g. academic entrepreneurs) is that they 
often lack commercial experience, which may result in a tendency to focus on the 
technical aspects of innovation to the detriment of commercial aspects (Franklin et al., 
2001). Commercial knowledge is needed in the venture to ensure that the founding 
team is alert to external market cues. Information from outside the venture needs to be 
received, processed and then responded to, to ensure that the product / service meets 
market requirements. Without some commercial knowledge in the founding team, 
team members may not be alert to valuable market information.  
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Indeed, numerous studies highlight the importance of interaction between 
technical (R&D, manufacturing) and more commercial roles (e.g. marketing and sales) 
for both the commercialization of technology and innovation speed (Atuahene-Gima 
and Evagelista, 2000; Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1987; Schoonhoven et al., 1990; 
Song and Parry, 1992). By establishing a forum for interactive learning, including 
overlapping of problem solving, Kessler and Chakrabarti (1996) and Meyer (1993) 
propose that a multifunctional team will be indispensable for rapid innovation speed.  
Table 3 shows that in most cases, the founding team had someone with 
commercial experience. The exceptions were SBEF4 (successful) and SBEF8 (failed). 
SBEF4 was an unusual case because it was a service company. Although the four 
founders did not possess considerable commercial experience, two of the founders 
worked for large microelectronics companies (Philips and Acatel) while the other two 
founders worked for IMEC and a university. Further, as the TTO commented, they 
rapidly developed both a commercial function and a commercial attitude:  
 
“The speed at which the researchers that joined SBEF4 developed a 
commercial attitude was exceptional. This probably had to do with the fact 
that they had done quite some contract research at the research institute. 
Actually, the start-up had a similar business model in the first years: the 
researchers carried out projects at the customer’s site, where they used their 
technical knowledge, and were at the same time in close contact with the 
customer”.  
 
All founders were able to access customers relatively quickly through their 
contacts from prior employers. Further, the board of directors included a number of 
members who were brought in to provide further access to customers.   
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In the case of SBEF8 one of the founders, on paper, had some commercial 
experience as he already owned another business. However, the TTO at the time 
commented that:  
 
“He did not show any industrial spirit or reflection… It was impossible to 
convince him that the technology he worked on and developed was not 
sufficient to build a company around. He was convinced that his work was 
done, the sensor was tested and ready. The economic reality proved that it 
wasn’t. Up to this moment he was convinced that SBEF8 had a product that 
could be brought to the market in a profitable way”.  
 
The SBEF8 case illustrates the importance of not just having commercial 
experience but also making sure that a commercial mindset develops alongside the 
experience gained.  
This discussion leads to the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2: The more that the SBEF team incorporates both tacit 
knowledge about the technology and a commercial mindset, the greater the 
chances of reaching sufficient innovation speed that will lead to enhanced 
SBEF performance.   
 
The presence of both tacit knowledge of the technology and commercial 
experience in the founding team, however, does not necessarily mean that these two 
aspects will be integrated. Nooteboom (2002), examining general issues related to 
trust, suggested that to the extent that people have developed along different life paths 
and in different environments (e.g. technical versus commercial), they will interpret, 
understand and evaluate the world differently. This, he argued, leads to the concept of 
cognitive distance, that is the extent to which there is overlap of, and mappings 
between, different sets of cognitive constructs. Cognitive distance yields both an 
opportunity and a problem. Opportunities arise as contact with others provides the 
possibility to profit from the insights that arise from their different experience. 
Problems arise because, as cognitive distance increases, it becomes more difficult to 
understand the actions and expressions of a partner (Nooteboom, 2002).  
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In the context examined here, this suggests that high levels of cognitive 
distance between technical and commercial founding team members may be expected 
to interfere with effective knowledge sharing and combination which is needed to 
commercialize technology rapidly. As intimated earlier, for codified knowledge to be 
diffused, the recipient must be able to ‘read’ the codes (Cowan and Foray, 1993). If 
the knowledge is tacit, new codes and formulae are needed to enable knowledge to be 
shared and combined; a process which takes time (Zucker et al., 2002). If cognitive 
distance is too high, team members may be unable to ‘read’ the codes and / or develop 
new codes quickly enough to respond to market change. Common to our successful 
cases (with the exception of SBEF4 as explained above) was the observation that 
those team members who possessed commercial experience also tended to have 
technical expertise as well as experience of working with IMEC (see Table 3). This 
might thus be seen as a means of reducing cognitive distance among team members. 
For instance, the following quote from an SBEF 3 founder was representative of the 
views of other SBEF 3 founding members and the TTO: 
 
“Although the founding team consisted of 8 people, the core team consisted of 
3 people. These three people had worked together at IMEC since 1987. One of 
them was not planning on joining. However, the lead investor wondered why 
he would not join, given the technical experience he had had for 14 years 
within the research team and given his IMEC experience.  At founding, he 
became Sales and Marketing manager and collaborated extensively with the 
other two core people, who became CEO and CTO.” 
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Experience working with IMEC suggests that the founders’ technical expertise 
is particularly well suited to microelectronics (the area in which IMEC operates) and 
therefore represents a source of common language among team members. We argue 
that these aspects of technical knowledge are important because they can help reduce 
cognitive distance between the “commercial people” and the “technology people”. 
This suggests that while heterogeneity in the team is important (Ensley and Hmieleski, 
2005), without a technical background it may be difficult for the commercial person, 
who is alert to external market information, to ‘translate’ this so the researchers can 
understand the implications for the design of the technology / product. Similarly, it is 
likely to help if the commercial person, who has dealings with customers, can know 
what is feasible and the extent to which the product can or cannot be tailored to meet 
customer requirements. For instance, the CEO of SBEF9 comments: 
 
“ Soon after the creation of SBEF9, I realized that the product was in a much 
earlier stage of development than I had expected. However, none of the 
original researchers were willing to support the further development, which 
made me turn to a recruitment agency that could help me hiring a salesperson 
and a technical person. In the end, we recruited both profiles. Looking back at 
the recruitment, one could have predicted that the team was not going to work: 
the salesman had sufficient sales experience, but lacked any experience or 
affinity with the technology. On the other hand, the technical person was an 
engineer ‘pur sang’[i.e. pure blood] who only engaged in the technical part of 
his job.” 
 
Based on the above discussion we propose the following:  
 
Proposition 3: The lower the cognitive distance between the SBEF team 
members with tacit knowledge about the technology and those with a 
commercial mindset, the greater the chances of reaching sufficient innovation 
speed that will lead to enhanced SBEF performance   
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Insert Table 3 About Here 
 
DISCUSSION 
This study aimed at understanding the nature of the relationship between the 
knowledge of team founders, innovation speed and SBEF performance. Using an 
inductive case study methodology, our research reveals the importance of transferring 
both tacit knowledge about the technology and commercial knowledge. Our research 
also identifies important modes by which this knowledge might be best transferred and 
leveraged in order to contribute to innovation speed and commercialization success. A 
diagrammatic representation of the model that arises from our analyses is presented in 
Fig. 1. We elaborate below.  
 
Insert Figure 1 About Here 
First, our analysis suggests that in order to successfully transfer tacit 
knowledge about the technology, a high proportion of the original researchers who 
worked on developing the technology should join the new venture, preferably as 
founders (P1). Co-location and co-presence allow for greater interaction which 
improves access to tacit knowledge transfer which is in the heads of the researchers. 
Participation in the new venture by becoming part of the founding team can also 
increase intrinsic motivation, which further promotes tacit knowledge transfer. Our 
results show that where none or only a limited number of the original researchers join 
the founding team, or when tacit knowledge transfer is attempted through research 
contracts, innovation speed is too slow, not allowing the new ventures to go through 
the process from technology to product or service on the market at sufficient high 
speed, and therefore preventing successful commercialization of research results. This 
can be explained by the nature of the innovation process involving problem solving. 
Because the product is rarely market ready, it needs to be fine-tuned to meet customer 
requirements.  
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Tacit knowledge has an important role in problem solving by stimulating the 
requisite variety of ideas and then in the convergence of ideas that lead to clearly 
actionable next steps (Leonard and Sensiper, 1996). The lack of access to tacit 
knowledge prevented a number of the cases from further developing the technology at 
a sufficient pace and hence reduced innovation speed. In some of our cases, it was 
clear that overconfidence by the TTO on the market readiness of the new technology 
caused ventures to be set up in an early stage without the involvement of the original 
researchers. In other words, the founding team did not possess the necessary tacit 
knowledge to further develop the technology into a marketable entity, which 
subsequently led to the failure of the venture.  
Second, our research shows that the transfer of tacit knowledge will lead to 
successful commercialization of the technology if the founding team also includes 
member(s) with commercial experience (P2). Commercial knowledge is needed to 
access and interpret market information that is crucial for developing a market-ready 
product / service. However, thirdly and crucially, we obtain the novel insight that it is 
important to reduce the cognitive distance between members of the team with 
commercial and technical expertise (P3). If cognitive distance is too great, the 
commercial team member may be unable to explain the relevance or implications of 
market information to the technical members. This likely reduces innovation speed 
and makes the new venture less responsive to market change / information. Being in 
possession of technical knowledge (e.g. having some technical experience and 
preferably experience of working in the same technology sector) may also help the 
commercial team members’ interactions with customers because they understand if 
and how the product / service can be tailored to suit customer demands. This insight is 
important given the emphasis in recent literature on the need for commercial expertise 
in research-based spin-out ventures.    
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Implications  
This research has a number of implications for TTOs, science based 
entrepreneurs, the venture capital community, policy makers and the academic 
community.  
For TTOs our results show that when innovation speed is important (which is 
often the case for high tech ventures (Eisenhardt, 1989b)), the transfer of the 
researchers who developed the technology will be crucial. Our research also confirms 
the importance of assembling a founding team whose members have complementary 
skills. In particular, consistent with prior research we find that a commercial mindset 
is also needed in the new venture. However, our research goes beyond previous 
research by revealing that the benefits of this commercial mindset will be maximized 
if the team member with commercial experience also has some technical expertise, 
preferably in a domain related to the technology on which the new venture is based. 
Crucially, we propose that it is essential for team members to be  able to transfer their 
tacit commercial and technical experience to other team members for innovation speed 
to be achieved.  
Our results lead to a number of new challenges for technology transfer offices 
since they emphasize the importance of commitment by the original researchers to the 
new SBEF. We suggest that it will be hard to achieve successful commercialization by 
“pushing” the technology into the market without the commitment of the scientists 
who discovered / invented the technology. An important role for the technology 
transfer officer will lie in the stimulation of researchers to commercialize their 
technology and the creation of awareness of entrepreneurship as a potential career 
move within research communities. A bigger challenge facing technology transfer 
officers, however, is how to balance the need to transfer scientists to new ventures on 
the one hand, whilst considering the implications of losing teams of researchers from 
the PRI. The TTO at IMEC reveals why there may at times be reluctance to transfer 
researchers from the original research team to the founding team: 
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“The transfer of the researchers to the new venture was not an easy decision. 
Even though we knew that it was crucial for the future success of the company, for 
IMEC it meant losing top researchers, who had been with the organization for many 
years, losing knowledge and technology and loosing potential contract research 
budgets.” 
 
The loss of valuable scientists might therefore affect the critical mass of 
researchers needed to achieve research goals and other commercialization alternatives 
(licensing, contract research) of the research institute (Wright et al., 2008). 
TTOs should also be aware of the importance of assessing the stage of 
development of the technology at the time of founding, and the challenges that new 
ventures face when the venture is launched at an early stage of technological 
development. Our cases show that the researchers who work on developing the 
technology are probably in the best position to assess the market readiness of the 
technology. Researchers who refused to join founding teams often indicated that this 
was because they felt that the technology was not yet ready for the start-up. At the 
same time, researchers that have a market ready product may be reluctant to 
commercialize the technology, wanting to continually develop and refine the 
technology. Here again, the TTO can play a role in raising awareness of the potential 
advantages of an entrepreneurial career. This role is particularly important in “general 
universities”, where there are commercialisation opportunities based on a wide range 
of technological domains (Wright et al., 2008). It is unlikely the TTO will have 
knowledge about all technological domains, which will be necessary to assess the 
technological development stage. Therefore, we believe the role of the TTO to be 
mainly one of awareness creation, and guidance of the researchers through the 
commercialization process upon their initiative, which is an intensive process and 
requires TTO capacity. The research institute under study in this paper has evolved in 
the way that it handles commercialization through new venture establishment. An 
Incubation and Industrialization department was established in 1997 and currently 
consists of a team of 8 people of which 3 persons are directly engaged in evaluating 
and supporting specific spin out projects. Nowadays at IMEC, no spin-offs are created 
without prototype. This requires the availability of sufficient resources to finance the 
development of the prototypes. In the case of IMEC, this stage is funded through the 
surplus value realized on the sales of the “first” generation spin-offs that are discussed 
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in this paper. More specifically, IMEC realized an annual return on investment of 
22.69% on the sales of participations we examined. This figure compares very 
favourably to returns on investment in early stage ventures reported elsewhere. Many 
researchers have shown that in this stage of investment it is hard to realize positive 
returns on investment, and that there is an imbalance between the risk that is involved 
with these investments and the return (Murray and Marriott, 1998; Lockett, Murray 
and Wright, 2002). Murray and Marriott (1998) report, based on a study of Venture 
Economics and Bannock Consulting (1997), a pooled IRR for early stage investments 
of 5.7% per year. A similar study by Thomson Venture Economics and EVCA (2004) 
report a pooled IRR of 1.9% for early stage investments.  
For science based entrepreneurs, our study suggests that they should be aware 
that their involvement and commitment will be crucial for the successful 
commercialization of the technology they developed. They should also be aware of the 
need to add commercially minded people to the founding team. Science-based 
entrepreneurs may be wary of team members with a commercial background, fearing 
that they will not understand the technology and will try to “push” the product to 
market prematurely. Our cases suggest that a compromise route is an option and 
indeed a desirable one. Science-based entrepreneurs may be able to alleviate their 
concerns by introducing team members who have a technical background but who 
have also been able to acquire commercial expertise. Having said this, commercial 
experience on paper does not necessarily mean that the team member has a 
commercial mindset. TTOs may have an important role to play in coaching team 
members to develop more of a commercial orientation in approaching problems and 
opportunities relating to the technology.  
Third, for the venture capital community, our findings have implications for 
the screening of investments. The composition of the team is among the main features 
of a proposal venture capitalists look at when screening and evaluating an investment 
opportunity, yet this is particularly a problematical area in spin-outs from PRIs 
(Wright, et al., 2006). Managerial and entrepreneurial experience of the team members 
is often given much greater credence than technical experience (Shepherd and 
Zacharakis, 1998; Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984). While the former types of experience 
are clearly important, the importance of technical knowledge (in particular tacit 
knowledge) should not be underestimated, especially in SBEFs. Our research shows 
that it is not sufficient for an investor to check the strength of the appropriation regime 
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of the technology, which refers to the codified knowledge in the new venture, but also 
to look at the tacit knowledge which will be crucial for translating the technology into 
a marketable product or service. Our research therefore calls for an increased attention 
by investors to the founding team as a whole, and for an increased attention to 
assessing the commitment of the initial developers of the technology and their 
cognitive distance to the person exerting the commercial role.  
Our research also has a number of implications for policy makers who have to 
a large extent directed their efforts on policy towards technology transfer. Much of the 
policy work on commercialization through spin-offs has been oriented towards the 
transfer of codified knowledge (Siegel, Veugelers and Wright, 2007). Our research 
calls for greater attention by policy-makers to the design of initiatives that may 
promote and support greater tacit knowledge transfer. We believe that governments 
have an important role to play in awareness creation towards commercialization in the 
research community, for instance by setting up educational programmes that 
specifically focus on commercialization of research results.  
Finally, this research is of interest to academia. By providing a model for when 
knowledge in SBEFs in important and how it can be transferred effectively from the 
research institute to the SBEF, this research contributes to Lockett et al. (2005)’s call 
for adopting a knowledge based view (KBV) when studying SBEFs. The KBV of 
SBEFs suggests that a broader of view of technology transfer needs to be assumed; 
one that includes the transfer of knowledge surrounding the technology. Apart from 
joining Lockett et al. (2005)’s concerns for an increase interest in knowledge and 
knowledge transfer, it indicates what type of knowledge and knowledge transfer 
matter under which conditions (cognitive distance) for successful commercialization.  
 
Limitation and directions for further research 
This research has a number of limitations that lead to different directions for 
further research. First, given that we studied the ventures created at a research institute 
that is specifically focussing on one technology, namely micro-electronics, one 
concern may be the generalization of our results. Indeed, innovation speed was found 
to be especially important for high tech businesses and radical innovation (Kessler and 
Chakrabarti, 1996).  
29 
 
However, we do believe that our results can be generalized towards all science 
based entrepreneurial ventures, since universities and research institutes are seen to 
mainly work on radical technologies (Nelson, 1991). Further research should indicate 
the extent to which these results hold in other technology transfer cases, for instance in 
the case of corporate spin-offs, or in the case of other types of commercialization, for 
instance through licensing.  
Second, given that we measured success and failure using data on exit of the 
investment by the research institute, our findings do not allow us to draw conclusions 
on the long term viability of the science based entrepreneurial ventures. This is 
however only the case for two of the ventures studied, which are still in the VC 
portfolio. Yet, given that these two were in a commercialization phase at the moment 
that IMEC exited the investments, and given that we studied the impact of tacit 
knowledge transfer on innovation speed, studying these cases in relation to their later 
performance probably would not change the conclusions of this research.  
Third, this research allowed us to assess the effectiveness of the tacit transfer 
mechanisms that IMEC used, but does not assess any other transfer mechanisms. For 
instance, in Israel, at the Weiszman Institute in Tel Aviv, an incentive system exists 
that requires that the original researchers remain at the research institute, but do 
receive part of the proceeds of the venture that originates from the research activities. 
In this way, intrinsic motivation for tacit knowledge transfer is in place, without 
physically moving the original researchers to the new venture. Further research should 
assess the extent to which these new and specific types of tacit knowledge transfer are 
effective in generating innovation speed.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study has presented a first attempt to bring together insights relating to 
innovation speed and the knowledge of founding entrepreneurs required to examine 
the nature of the relationship between the knowledge of team founders, innovation 
speed and SBEF performance. We used a novel longitudinal inductive study 
comprising nine case studies of SBEFs that originated from IMEC, a top research 
institute in the area of micro-electronics situated in Belgium.  
30 
 
Our analysis shows that a higher proportion of inventors in the founding team 
and a knowledge composition in the team that involved both technical and a 
commercial mindset was associated with the transfer of the tacit knowledge required 
for higher innovation speed. However, we also show that the cognitive distance 
between the possessors of tacit knowledge surrounding the technology and the 
commercial people cannot be too large. Those SBEFs in which the people who had 
commercial experience also had prior technical expertise and working experience 
within the PRI were the most successful in achieving requisite innovation speed. As 
such, have extended prior research that has focused on the UTTO level to identify the 
most effective configurations of entrepreneurial teams for the commercialization of 
research, and in particular to understanding the link between knowledge, innovation 
speed and venture success, at the SBEF level.   
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TABLE 1 
 
Characteristics of cases 
 
Name 
of 
spin-
off 
Founding 
date 
Technology Product 
or 
service 
company 
at start-
up 
Venture outcome 
(Success/Failure) 
Time 
till 
exit 
for 
IMEC 
Innovation speed 
      Product 
development 
stage at 
founding 
Time to 
product/service 
SBEF1 1996 Chips for 
satellite 
communication 
Product S (acquired) 5 
years 
Alpha 
prototype 
0.5 years 
SBEF2 1996 Software tools 
for system 
level designs 
Product S (sold to VC) 7 
years 
Alpha 
prototype 
0.5 years 
SBEF3 1999 Image sensors Product S (acquired) 4 
years 
Product/service 
ready 
0 years 
SBEF4 1991 System-on-
Chip design 
services 
Service S (acquired) 9 
years 
Product/service 
ready 
0 years 
SBEF5 1996 Design 
technologies 
for embedded 
software in 
electronic 
systems 
Product F (sold to VC) 7 
years 
Alpha 
prototype 
3 years 
SBEF6 1992 Measurement 
technology for 
reliability of 
electronic 
components 
Product F (bankrupt) 8 
years 
Pre-prototype 7 years 
SBEF7 2002 Fixed wireless 
access 
Product F (bankrupt) 1 
year 
Pre-prototype Never 
finalized 
SBEF8 1998 Electronic nose 
manufacturer 
Product F (bankrupt) 3 
years 
Pre-prototype Never 
finalized 
SBEF9 1996 Image sensors Product F (bankrupt) 3 
years 
Alpha 
prototype 
3 years 
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TABLE 2 
Tacit knowledge and Innovation speed 
 
Company 
name 
Tacit knowledge Innovation Speed 
 Team 
Size 
Number of 
researchers 
joining spin-off 
Proportion of 
founding team 
that were 
original 
researchers 
Product 
development 
stage at 
founding 
Time to 
product/service 
SBEF1 4 3 out of 10 75% Alpha 
prototype 
0.5 years 
SBEF2 7 6 out of 6 86% Alpha 
prototype 
0.5 years 
SBEF3 11 8 out of 8 73% Product/service 
ready 
0 years 
SBEF4 4 4 out of 4 100% Product/service 
ready              
0 years 
SBEF5 4 4 out of 10 100% Alpha 
prototype 
3 years 
SBEF6 1 0 0% Pre-prototype 7 years 
SBEF7 3 1 out of 20 
(8 IMEC 
employees 
contracted) 
33% Pre-prototype Never finalized 
SBEF8 3 2 out of 3 (but 
left the company 
early) 
67% down to 
0% 
Pre-prototype Never finalized 
SBEF9 1 0 0% Alpha 
prototype 
3 years 
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TABLE 3 
Commercial knowledge and indicators of cognitive distance 
 
Company 
name 
Market interface Cognitive distance 
 Number of people with 
commercial experience 
Commercial and technical 
experience? 
Prior working experience 
with IMEC? 
SBEF1 1 Y Y 
SBEF2 2 Y Y 
SBEF3 1 Y Y 
SBEF4 0 Na Na 
SBEF5 1 Y Y 
SBEF6 1 Y Y (10 years earlier) 
SBEF7 1 N N 
SBEF8 0 Na Na 
SBEF9 1 1 N 
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FIGURE 1 
 
Model of Relationship between Tacit Knowledge, Innovation Speed and SBEF 
Performance 
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